Bruce Mutsvairo
The Hague University of Applied Sciences, the Netherlands
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Discussing Zimbabwean politics would be insignificant without a comprehensive analysis of The Herald’s relationship with the country’s political order. The newspaper has historically taken a supportive discourse to Mugabe’s policies, evidently attracting coverage disapproval from the president’s opponents. This paper examines The Herald’s role in contributing to the political endurance of President Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party. By analyzing articles sampled from the paper’s print and online editions, it traces the origins of the broadsheet’s pro-ZANU-PF editorial positions, scrutinizing content and critically probing not only the motive but also the impact of the newspaper’s strong allegiance to the revolutionary party. This paper examines The Herald newspaper’s role in safeguarding the seemingly unparalleled longevity of Zimbabwe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. Through an analysis of a sample of stories from both the paper’s print and online editions, the study traces the origins of the broadsheet’s ostensibly unflagging pro-ZANU-PF editorial positions, turning to article analysis to critically probe not only the motive but also the impact of the newspaper’s assumed open allegiance to the revolutionary party. In a nation believed battered by perceived state brutality and widening political differences, The Herald has been accused of significantly influencing the pace of dictatorship while guardedly manipulating information to prop up President Robert Mugabe’s party. The paper has become so important over the years that its often uncompromising, one-sided style of reporting has earned it praise among militant ZANU-PF hardliners while bitterly attracting widespread criticism from critics of the long-serving party. Keywords: The Herald, propaganda, politics, democracy, Zimbabwe, manipulation. |
In this article, the author has endeavored to first problematize The Herald newspaper’s role in Zimbabwean society. The first problem lies within the institution itself. Its role and responsibility to provide citizens with reliable news content have all been severely questioned by critics at home and abroad because of its traditional, openly pro-government stance. The second problem, which is related to the first, is associated with the newspaper’s ownership structure, which presumably forces editors to pointedly paint a positive picture on stories involving ZANU-PF officials even when unprejudiced scrutiny is needed while anything that seeks to dehumanize, discredit or demonize the opposition attracts instant attention and is decidedly disseminated at whatever cost. The author, therefore, decided to formulate one central research question: To what extent do The Herald’s historical ties with ZANU-PF contribute to its perceived biased coverage of news events?
Propaganda is commonly associated with Adolf Hitler during the Second World War even though it should be traced back to 500 years B. C., to Alexander the Great in the Ancient World, according to Jowett and O’Donnell (2006). As long as mankind has lived in the aftermath of the 19th C Industrial Revolution, there has always been propaganda, argues Pratkanis and Aronson (1991) who link propaganda with the invention of human civilizations. Jackall (1995) opines that propaganda’s origins can effectively be found in religion arguing between 1621–1623 a propaganda office was set up by Pope Gregory XV. Ngoa (2006) is adamant there is a strong connection between advertising and propaganda, suggesting that with the coming of the Industrial Revolution, lifestyles changed, automatically creating the need to guide the consumer.
Lasswell (1927), one of the most influential scholars in the field, has defined propaganda as “the control of opinion by significant symbols, or to speak more accurately by stories, rumors, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication” (p. 627). Contemporary scholars Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) have opted for a more cautious approach, defining propaganda “as the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 7). Manipulation is thus very central in both definitions, supporting an observation by Ross (2002) that propaganda is based on the manipulation of symbols. Persuasion is a key characteristic in Ross’s (2002) definition, which concludes propaganda aims to “persuade a socially significant group of people on behalf of a political institution, organization or cause” (p. 24) while Pratkanis and Turner (1996) attempt to illustrate how propaganda effectively works by proposing that it turns to “simple images and slogans that truncate thought by playing on prejudices and emotions” (p. 190).
Bernays (1928), another leading scholar in the field, concludes: “Modern propaganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group” (p.25). Even though he believed that in spite of its negative connotations, propaganda was not always ruthless, it should be pointed out that the propagandist’s intentions have always been to convince he is right even if it means that he has to deceive. Thus, propaganda does not necessarily have to be outright lies. There has to be an element of truth in everything that is reported. However, not everything has to be accurate as suggested by Cunningham (2001), who – paying tribute to the earlier works of Ellul (1957) and Coombs (1993) – concludes “We now understand that propaganda is a far more diversified and complex phenomenon than just uttering lies and the slick manipulation of beliefs and language” (p.138).
Tactics and techniques used in propaganda vary. Sproule (1994) pinpoints that propaganda operates clandestinely and therefore the sender will not openly admit that his messages carry manipulative elements. Propaganda rarely relies on authority (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Jowett and O’Donnell (2006) also consider fabrication and distortion of information to be among the most commonly used techniques of propaganda. Smith (1989) concurs, arguing apart from using distortions, the propagandist may also use deliberate falsehoods and omissions. The propagandist can also calculatingly withhold vital information (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). A. Lee and E. Lee (1972) credit the then New York-based Institute of Propaganda Analysis (IPA) for its instrumental role in detecting techniques used in propaganda. These include bandwagon, which appeals to the audience by creating an impression that everyone else is supporting the idea or policy; therefore, presumably anyone who chooses not to take part is automatically isolated. Name-calling attaches negative symbols to a person or idea in order to discredit it while glittering generalities are manipulative in the sense that they attach highly valued societal concepts such as democracy to a policy, potentially forcing people, including those who do not know what it means, to support it based on a generalized view that it is positive.
One of the most commonly accepted norms to the success of democracy is the system’s inseparable relationship to a free press. It has been repeatedly claimed that freedom of expression is the lifeblood of democracy (Fog, 2004; Wahl-Jorgenson & Hanitzsch, 2009; Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2012). We are made to believe that media and democracy are inseparable, which perhaps explains why the two words are often used interchangeably. The media provide citizens with information essential to the decisions they make, especially when choosing the country’s political leaders (Fog, 2004). The media is a source of power that influence, control, and promote new standards in society or reinforce existing ones (Lal, Sharma, & Ahmed, 2007). During his decades-long rule, President Mugabe, deliberately or not, has had a dependable mouthpiece for disbursing information. At the same time, critics, especially his opponents in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party, have dismissed it as a cheap propaganda platform. The availability of several weekly newspapers, including those fiercely critical of President Mugabe, has failed to hold back The Herald’s market dominance. With the exception of the Daily News, which doubled its circulation from an initial 60,000 to 120,000 within a few months of its 1999 launch, The Herald, with 90,000 readers, has been the overwhelming force on the Zimbabwean media scene (Moyo, 2005). Nor did the arrival of several other post-independence political parties, including the MDC, destabilize the newspaper’s powerful support for ZANU-PF and authoritative market dominance.
Propaganda, for right or wrong reasons, is often associated with negative connotations. It is often perceived that propaganda techniques can only be employed by autocratic and despotic regimes. However, it has been argued that practically all governments, including the ones that affirm to democratic values, use some form of propaganda to bolster their support from other nations and citizenry (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). In its quest to discredit and disavow President Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe, the British government has also used propaganda techniques, one may argue. Continuously labeling President Mugabe a dictator, with a distasteful “human rights” record is an established propaganda technique associated with glittering generalities and name-calling especially when one considers the fact that it was Mugabe, who introduced basic “human rights” when he took over in 1980. There is no agreed definition of “dictator” even though it is quite clear that the term carries negative connotations, which the British government has used to help convince its allies in the European Union, Australia, Canada, the U.S., and New Zealand to impose sanctions against the Zimbabwean leader and his closest associates in 2002. That Mugabe had rigged national elections as was suggested at that time as the justification for launching a sanctions regime, is debatable because the Southern African Development Community (SADC) concluded in its assessment that the elections had been free and fair.
While The Herald does not hide its allegiance to ZANU-PF, it offers an alternative to the coverage of Zimbabwean politics, which since the launch of the land reform program in 2000 has largely been biased against the government of Zimbabwe. While the foreign and independent media outlets have sought to delegitimize Mugabe’s rule because of perceived land reform injustices and allegations of elections rigging, The Herald has maintained its strong nationalistic stance. It carefully echoes the government’s stance in blaming Zimbabwe’s woes on a coalition of local and international foes including white farmers, the British government, and the then opposition MDC party.
However, while very few can doubt the newspaper’s unshaken loyalty to ZANU-PF, it is important to explore the ways through which Zimbabweans consider the daily as a credible source of reliable news. Without the media, “people in societies would be isolated, not only from the rest of the world, but from governments, lawmakers, and neighboring towns and cities” (“Role of Media in democracy”. Retrieved July 16, 2012, from http://www.mona.uwi.edu/jct/documents/scott.pdf). The Herald’s approach to reporting, one can conclude, based on an analysis of its content, could potentially damage its position as a harbinger of fair-minded, impartial coverage of news. Indeed, the newspaper often fails to provide an accurate picture of Zimbabwean news by continuously supporting ZANU-PF policies regardless of the impact they may have on the people. However, as Fog (2004) would argue, how different is The Herald’s reporting from that of other media outlets, which adopt an editorial line aligned with their advertisers or sponsors? If The Herald has failed to provide a fair and balanced coverage of developments in Zimbabwe, has any Western newspaper been able to achieve that goal? Several studies have documented the deep distrust and debilitating disapproval among Africans of the West’s institutionalized media coverage of their continent (Maynard, 1974; Fair, 1992). Ebo (1992) even went as far as hypothesizing that Africa is depicted in the Western media as “a crocodile-infested dark continent where jungle life has perpetually eluded civilization” (p. 15). Willems (2005) unearthed evidence of systematic framing on the part of the British press coverage of the Zimbabwean crisis.
A closer analysis of the newspaper’s ownership helps explain its perceived bias towards ZANU-PF. The newspaper is majority-owned by Zimbabwe Newspapers Group, Zimpapers, which holds 51.09% of the shares (Munyuki, 2005). The remaining shares are owned by the nation’s leading financial firm, Old Mutual, and several other government-connected private companies (Open Society Institute, 2009). It is not surprising, then, if The Herald takes orders from its masters. Yet it is the newspaper’s failure to give a platform to a variety of voices and its deliberate decision to label anyone who criticizes ZANU-PF a “traitor” that may potentially help undermine its authority.
By choosing to abandon impartial and objective reporting, instead maintaining an unswerving nationalistic pro-ZANU-PF agenda, the newspaper has ignored a fundamental ethic of journalism. Zimbabweans who have left the country because of the fledging economic crisis are considered traitors and allies of the West in a strongly generalized perspective, which normally ignores the fact that pro-Mugabe supporters may have also left the country. One could also argue that the ubiquitous barrage of criticism leveled against the MDC for supporting the European Union’s “targeted” sanctions ignores ZANU-PF’s actions that allegedly prompted the sanctions, including allegations of gross human rights violations brought by independent players such as the United Nations. Interestingly, ZANU-PF politicians, even those born after independence from Britain in 1980, are addressed as “Comrade”, to reflect their supposed credentials as veteran bush war fighters. MDC officials, by contrast, are referred to as “Mr.”, including those who fought in the 1970s guerrilla wars. The Herald thus measures patriotism by party allegiance.
The Herald’s relationship with the government is symbiotic. While faithfully disseminating the ruling party’s political, social, and economic agenda, it has been guaranteed exclusivity to news, ensuring that it secures “scoops” away from independent journalists and maintains its journalistic edge against competitors. President Mugabe historically travels with a reporter from The Herald on most of his foreign trips. This favor is not extended to journalists from the private media. Accordingly, the newspaper has always had an unchallenged access to the President. Thus, the reports may be dismissed as manipulative propaganda though its coverage may actually be informative, despite the fact that the main objective, like most forms of propaganda, is to create a favorable public response. Though its content is one-sided, the paper has long been a vital and occasionally credible source of Zimbabwean news. For instance, while various foreign media incorrectly reported that President Mugabe had left the country in the aftermath of his first-round defeat to Tsvangirai in the 2008 elections, The Herald had it right: the president had not left the country. In 2012, Western media outlets including The Sydney Morning Herald incorrectly speculated that President Mugabe may have died during a trip to Singapore (Levy, 2012). As it turned out, The Herald, which had a reporter traveling with Mugabe, rebuffed these reports, suggesting as what later turned out to be the case that Mugabe was alive.
Among several challenges faced by any new nation, Hobsbawm (1992) introduces the question of loyalty to, and identification with, the state and ruling system. A carefully crafted ZANU-PF art of dominance has seen the nationalistic party controlling Zimbabwe’s political landscape uninterrupted over the past three decades. The Herald’s pro-state stance can be traced back to the heyday of its predecessor, The Rhodesian Herald, which was then a powerful propaganda platform for the Rhodesian Front in 1963, according to Windrich (1981). The flagrant control of the press is an entrenched characteristic of the legacy of colonialism in post-colonial Africa, argues Mukasa (2003). Determined to discontinue foreign ownership of the press, President Mugabe’s government created the state-controlled Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT), a watchdog that eventually took overall ownership of The Herald and its sister papers, according to Nyahunzvi (2001).
There is a wealth of evidence to show The Herald has been fronting ZANU-PF’s political ideologies since its inception in 1981. Political rivalry pitting Mugabe’s ZANU and old foe Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union spilled into the state media newsrooms. Nkomo claimed editors either ignored or twisted his speeches following a government decree restricting his speeches to parliament. Furthermore, Willie Musarurwa, who in 1981 became the first black editor of The Herald’s sister paper The Sunday Mail, was fired for his connections with Nkomo’s ZAPU although some scholars have argued that his independent editorial line cost him his job (Chikuhwa, 2004, 60). Even though several editors may have graced the nation’s oldest newspaper, nothing seems to bring them together more than their unbending support for government policies. Those who refused to toe the ZANU-PF line have paid a heavy price.
Chikuhwa (2004) points to Henry Muradzikwa, Musarurwa’s replacement, who was removed from his job over a story that claimed that 60 Zimbabwean students had been deported from Cuba for unspecified health reasons (p.61). The story implied that the students had AIDS, which was seen as potentially damaging to Zimbabwe’s relations with the communist island. While enjoying its monopoly during the first years of independence, The Herald undoubtedly carried a compound of challenges that included serving a racially and ethnically divided nation fresh from the horrors of war. Satisfying the believers of press freedom could not have been tougher. However, it appears the lack of independent media players at independence proved detrimental to the overall government media policy over the years.
While Mukasa (2003) argues that ZANU-PF’s media control resolve was tested in the 1990s with the rise of weekly newspapers such as The Zimbabwe Independent, The Standard, and The Daily News, it goes without saying that The Herald’s political and social influence has remained steadfast. Before its unexpected return in 2010, The Daily News, which claims to be the first independent Zimbabwean daily newspaper, had been encumbered by plenty of problems, falling victim to a catalogue of new media laws introduced by the government under Jonathan Moyo’s five-year reign as information minister. Moyo’s period in office witnessed one of the most unalleviated propaganda campaigns in post-colonial Africa (Chitando, 2005). The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) introduced a rigorous licensing system for media outlets, restricting foreign ownership of the media and prolonging The Herald’s monopoly since the other privately-run newspapers were weeklies. Despite their influence, they could not challenge The Herald’s circulation figures. Intimidation against journalists regardless of their political affiliation has been commonplace in Zimbabwe, but working for the independent press has been more daunting. Examples of state-sanctioned repression and intimidation of the private media can be seen in the 2007 incident involving veteran journalist Bill Saidi. A soldier, apparently unhappy with an article published in Saidi’s Standard newspaper, left an envelope with a bullet and a handwritten note reading, “What is this? Watch your step” (Timberg, 2007).
Despite its fierce support for ZANU-PF, there have been several occasions when the newspaper attacked the party. The Herald, Chikuhwa (2004) reckons, bitterly criticized the government in the aftermath of the December 1997 national protest and the food riots a year later. Also, according to Mukasa (2003), police brutality, which rarely gets attention in The Herald, hogged the limelight after a teargas canister hit the newspaper’s headquarters during the 1998 political disturbances, prompting editor Tommy Sithole to make a rare public attack on the police. However, this extraordinary criticism should not be taken as a sign of balanced journalism. Ideologically, the newspaper has always supported ZANU-PF. In the unlikely event of ZANU-PF becoming an opposition party, there is no evidence to suggest that the paper is prepared to drop its loyalty. Its roots are deeply enmeshed in the revolution against colonialism, and that identity is likely to remain its characteristic feature. President Mugabe’s credibility as a freedom fighter, which The Herald is keen to remind its readers, is there for everyone to see. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September 2002, Mugabe was treated to elated applause for his “braveness” in telling Tony Blair to keep his Britain while he kept “his Zimbabwe” (The Herald, 2002). Mugabe’s popularity, readers are told, is based on his desire to see colonial injustices corrected. This is without a doubt a non-negotiable stance shared by Mugabe, The Herald, and indeed their supporters.
Endless repetition is a key technique used in propaganda. The Herald hopes that maintaining its sympathetic stance insofar as the government’s land reform exercise is concerned helps convince the audiences on the need for agrarian reforms. Chief among its editorial lines is the continued endorsement of the land reforms. While critics argue that it is unjustified to hand over seized farms to Black “war veterans” based on their war credentials and not their agricultural expertise, The Herald sees no problems with that. It views the land reform as enhancing economic expansion. Analyses of the reform exercise are always pro-Mugabe. It ignores the plight of White farmers losing the land or allegations from opposition parties that only those with close connections to ZANU-PF benefited from the land reform. While being repetitive is considered important in this case, consistency is also essential. These articles for example show the newspaper’s unshaken and continuous loyalty and support for the land reform. “Zimbabwe: War against Land Reform Unwinnable” (The Herald, 2009b), “Zimbabwe: Land Reform a Success–Survey” (The Herald, 2011, February 5), “Zimbabwe: Farmer Reaps Fruits of Land Reform” (The Herald, 2009a).
Through the World Book Multimedia Encyclopedia, the University of Leeds’ Institute of Communication identifies three ways through which propaganda works: (1) it calls for an action or opinion that it makes seem wise and reasonable; (2) it suggests that the action or opinion is moral and right; and (3) it provides a pleasant feeling, such as a sense of importance or of belonging. Stories in the newspaper normally remind readers of historical imbalances committed by Western imperialists. This is a chorus position echoed by the newspaper, editorially taking a position that Mugabe is a liberator and in fact a victim of neo-colonialism. This argument appears convincing due to its ability to give Zimbabweans a sense of shared belonging. Name-calling the West as imperialists puts Zimbabweans in a victims pot. Thus the assumption could then be that they all have one enemy.
Race plays a major role in the newspaper’s coverage of news. On a few occasions, President Mugabe has openly declared his dislike of white people (Associated Press, 2009). “The only white man you can trust is a dead white man”, Mugabe said according to The Telegraph (The Telegraph, 2008, June 5). The Herald has followed his cue. That antipathy, however, is not extended to the country’s white Olympic gold winner and former world record holder, Kirsty Coventry. While Mugabe has openly declared: “What we hate is not the color of their skins but the evil that emanates from them” (Radu, 2002), he, however, calls Coventry a “golden girl”, going as far as showing his gratitude to the sportswoman by offering her a diplomatic passport. Coventry’s sporting heroics offers The Herald a chance to market Zimbabwe as a place where purported racial disharmony normally reported in the West Press does not exist (Herald 2008).
In contrast, Andy Flower, another white sportsman, was lacerated for teaming up with a black teammate in openly denouncing President Mugabe during a cricket match in Harare February 2003 (Herald, 2003). Equally interesting is the way white ZANU-PF financial supporters John Bredenkamp and Billy Rautenbach are represented in the paper. The two businessmen are subject to unfriendly scrutiny and scornful attacks in the Western press. But a closer look at the way The Herald represents the two shows open bias. Stories such as “Zimbabwe: Bredenkamp Fights for Zim Citizenship” (The Herald, 2006b), “Zimbabwe: Court Grants Bredenkamp Reprieve” (The Herald, 2006c), and “Rautenbach Awarded Coal Mining Contract” (The Herald, 2007b) seek to portray the two as legitimate Zimbabwean businessmen with the country’s interests at heart. Using these few examples of white Zimbabweans sympathetic to the regime, The Herald seeks to discount allegations of supposed anti-white antagonism by the party.
The Herald sees itself as a perfect answer to Africa’s often negative and contrived image often depicted in the Western and independent media. It accuses Western media outlets with correspondents based in the region and local independent newspapers of distorting and misrepresenting facts about Zimbabwe. Bashing the MDC for its alleged connections to the independent media, The Herald (2009) said on its opinion page: The question is: Are the media in reality mouthpieces of political powers and governments for which they express sympathy? While The Herald reproaches other newspapers for bias against ZANU-PF, it does not address charges that its own reporting is slanted towards meeting coverage expectations of the party. But can that be quantified? A sample of 25 political stories in February 2008 prior to national elections showed that ZANU-PF received overwhelmingly favorable coverage, with 17 stories profiling, reporting or openly professing a slanted opinion towards ZANU-PF candidates. There was minimal coverage of campaign rallies for the opposition parties during this period.
A close look at more headlines in The Herald also discloses an ideological bent towards ZANU-PF. “Annan Forced to Abort Visit” is a headline in a story suggesting the former UN secretary general would not visit Zimbabwe for a first-hand examination on the country’s clean-up exercise. Annan, who had been accused by several pro-government commentators of siding with the U.S. and Britain on the issue, possibly handed the party some victory by calling off the trip, which Mugabe had previously called “politicized” (The Herald, 2005). Another headline “Guarantee Safety of Scribes, MDC Leadership Told” appears to put blame on the opposition party after two journalists covering a rally were allegedly threatened (The Herald, 2007a). A headline of this nature, intended for the ZANU-PF leadership, would not find space in The Herald, as it not only betrays the interests of the party but also potentially exposes it to readership scrutiny.
In his article on Patriotic Journalism, Ranger (2005) argues that hate journalism has flourished in the state-controlled media for many years. Die-hards in President Mugabe’s government view the state monopoly of media as an effective tool to sell ZANU-PF’s viewpoint while enforcing its patriotic agenda. After nearly 90 years of colonial and settler rule, it is understandable that nationalism and patriotism were paramount topics at independence in 1980. However, the two concepts remain on today’s agenda thanks largely to The Herald, which is keen to promote values endorsed by ZANU-PF. In a weekly column that appears each Saturday in The Herald, a government official using the pseudo byline “Nathaniel Manheru” lashes out at President Mugabe’s critics. The column introduced by Moyo and fairly popular within Zimbabwe’s political ranks has never had kind words for anyone who disagrees with the ZANU-PF. Its approach is a deliberate division of the world into two racial pillars, namely “black” and “white”. Anyone who disagrees with the Zimbabwean government is seen as siding the white colonialists. Others are treated as patriots or nationalists.
Despite Western sanctions, Manheru portrays a picture of hope, arguing Zimbabwe does not need to make friends outside the developing world. His column leaves little room for any intermediate position other than “for us or against us.” Here is what he had to say on Kofi Annan’s departure from the UN’s top office in 2006:
In Shona, Annan means “who is he with”? One last word for the United Nations. Kofi Annan is an African, and may the good African Lord be with him in his last days in office. Zimbabwe’s land question started in 2000, a good six years before the end of his term. He had lots of time to come, and indeed he came to the region countable times between then and now. Kofi Annan is an African who knows the West only too well. After all, the West is in his home, so to speak. (The Herald, 2006a)
According to Marxist media theory, the media is a “means of production” that is used by the ruling class to deny or defuse alternative ideas. The Herald’s mission is evident on many of its pages. The Herald does not only “tell the truth” but also ensures that alternative versions are discredited. The story headlined “Tsvangirai Begs for VP Post” does not only attempt to tell the truth, but it also denies other options being suggested in the rumor mill (The Herald, 2008a).
In Gramsci’s (1971) hegemony concept, the intellectual community plays an important role in the success of hegemonic domination. Exerting government control over the people is impossible without intellectuals. In the case of Zimbabwe, academics regularly contribute to The Herald trumpeting nationalist positions. Among them there are University professors and intellectuals Tafataona Mahoso, known to his opponents as “the Media Hangman”, and Vimbai Chivaura, both educated in the U.S. The majority of Mugabe’s cabinet ministers and close associates hold degrees from Western universities, where they also send their children. Yet, ironically, their articles or comments in The Herald are decidedly anti-Western. The paper was scathing in response to Australia’s decision to deport the children of ZANU-PF officials under the sanctions, denouncing it as a racist state (The Herald, 2007c). Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his predecessor Tony Blair are portrayed as main culprits responsible for Zimbabwe’s international isolation. The Herald, which makes no apologies for its support of ZANU-PF, has always maintained this view, arguing in its September 22, 2007 edition:
Communicating with fellow Europeans through the British press (Brown) clearly indicated British diplomacy had come unstuck. Clearly British diplomacy has foundered in its backyard, with Brown adopting for the rest of Europe Blair's odious megaphone diplomacy against Zimbabwe. (The Herald, 2007c)
As noted by Frankfurt school stalwarts Adorno and Horkheimer, the media has the ability to transform enlightenment into barbarism (Neve, 2010). True to their view that economic prosperity breeds mass deception, The Herald has used Zimbabwe’s once affluent economy to foster a formidable relationship with the country’s ruling elite. As the only daily available in the country, it certainly is a widely-read paper, powerfully delivering Mugabe’s message of hope, political independence, and economic prosperity, when annual inflation was topping over 231 million percent (Associated Press, 2008). The Herald still chose to defend the country’s economic policies, dedicating pages of praise to central bank governor Gideon Gono, the man criticized internationally for allegedly bringing down the country’s economy. Additionally, the newspaper also ran articles in which Zimbabwe was allegedly commended by its southern African neighbors for pioneering “innovative economic policies” (The Herald, 2008b).
Perhaps indicative of the anger The Herald aroused among its critics, the paper’s online version was brought down in May 2008 by an unknown hacker (Reuters, 2008). That happened after the vicious election campaign in which dozens of opposition supporters were beaten or killed, in a well-document campaign of violence (The Guardian, 2008). Victims included Harare deputy mayor Emmanuel Chiroto, whose wife Abigail was reportedly kidnapped and killed by suspected ruling party militias (The Independent, 2008). The Herald stood its ground, reporting pro-ZANU-PF stories while taking its usual line of attacking the opposition as a Western puppet, diverting attention from coverage over alleged killings. Chief among its editorial lines is the continued endorsement of the land reforms. While critics argue that it is unjustified to hand over seized farms to black “war veterans” based on their war credentials and not their agricultural expertise, The Herald sees no problems with that. It views the reform as enhancing economic expansion.
This study has shown the mechanism employed by The Herald in habitually showing its siding with the ZANU-PF. It finds itself supporting the ZANU-PF in almost every scenario perpetuated by the fact that the revolutionary party has deep-seated historical ties to the newspaper hence pro-party editors have always been associated with the daily. The articles reveal how The Herald uses propaganda to further extend its traditional relationship with Mugabe’s party. Hence, the paper’s ownership structure is pivotal in its quest to maintain the positive coverage. Understandably, the stories that are run by the newspaper tend to be openly biased towards ZANU-PF’s political cadres. Without its political steadfastness, it could be argued that Mugabe would not have managed to stay in power for over 30 years. Politically, The Herald has always been unapologetic for its pro-Mugabe stance. Faced with new Western-sponsored hostility, Mugabe has turned to the paper for the much-needed support. The MDC has accused The Herald of turning a blind eye to its campaign materials, for example during the 2005 and 2008 elections. However, as long as Zimbabwe remains a country dominated by Mugabe’s Marxist-centred party, The Herald’s disappearance from the Zimbabwean political arena cannot be foretold. It must be noted, however, that the same tactics employed by The Herald, are also used in various newspapers seeking to discredit Mugabe.
In the eyes of The Herald, Mugabe has become a cult-like figure, incapable of error but someone who it sees as being victimized by a Western distortion of history. Blame is put on the West in The Herald while Mugabe’s cadres are always presented as victims, regardless of the issue. Most importantly, Mugabe has redefined democracy thanks to The Herald. The newspaper convincingly applauds Zimbabwe’s democratic credentials. These are questioned in the West, thereby creating confusion as to what the agreed definition and key characteristics of democracy are. But despite its evidently pro-Mugabe reporting, The Herald cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. It is used to sell the ZANU-PF brand. It is a weapon in the party’s tactics to preserve power among all sectors of society, by reinforcing, for example, the party’s relationship with war veterans and the educated elite. As the newspaper’s majority shareholder, ZANU-PF may seek to justify its control of the newspaper merely on the grounds of its overpowering investments in the company, which gives it absolute decision-making powers. The Herald therefore occupies a very important seat in Zimbabwean politics, one that should never be underestimated.
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